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IN THE SUPREME COUKT 01'' Till'. STATE OF UTAH

FIRST EQUI•^ CORPORATION n:
FLORIDA . «-: ]' i o r id.-i corpo* a L i on ,
I •

•Vs-

CASE NO. 13798

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY, a i-<»-\
politic and corporate, and
DONALD A. CATRON, an individual,
Defendant-Respondent
BEAR-STEARNS & CO., HARRIS
UPHAM & CO., INC., HORNBLOWER
& WEEKS-HEMPHILL, NOYES, INC.,
LEHMAN BROTHERS, INC., MERRILL
LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH,
INC., SHEARSON, HAYDEN, STONE,
INC. and SUTRO & CO., INC.,
Amici Curiae.
APPELLANT'^ RK!'LY BRIEF

a^sNT
POINT I
USU'S CONTRACTS WITH FIRST EQUITY WERE NOT ULTRA VIRES.

Respo

•

• >eal s i g n i f i c a n t l y m i s s t a t e s b.-ih

the porii - . n of F i : -'. EquJL*. a'i! c e r t a i n a s p e c t ? ^f
and t h ^ r . i , r e r e q t n o -

.

.

'

. l o v a n t law,
seiecLeu questions

e f f e c t 01 C o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o u s c o n c e r n i n g
r i g h t s and powers of USU.
USU

pre-existing

< ~ y i s i.a L i v e Ac L ^ J.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1888 (Corap. Laws of Utah §§1852 e^t. seq.) could in no way have conferred general investment powers on USU is undercut by the language
(cited on page 17 of the Brief prepared by counsel for the amici
curiae brokers in this appeal) of the 1929 statute contained in
Sec. 15, ch. 41, Laws of Utah, which clearly affirms a legislative
intent to invest the University with broad, general, and independent
powers to manage its financial affairs. The subsequent repeal of
that statute has no effect upon its significance as legislative
history and as a reflection of legislative attitude.
To maintain that broad and general powers of investment were
granted is not, however, to argue that the University is totally
free from the control of the Legislature.

Appellant here does not

make an argument "virtually identical11 to the one urged by the University in University of Utah vs. Board of Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408,
295 P.2d 348 (1956) as Respondent claims on page 14 of its Brief.
In that case, the issue was whether or not the rights,,"immunities,
franchises and endowments11 vested in the University by the Utah
Constitution were to be free from the conditions and limitations
placed thereon by the territorial legislature to the same effect as
if no condition or limitation had been included in the territorial
legislation.

This Court concluded that such was not the case, but

that the rights and powers perpetuated in the University were those
existing prior to the adoption of the Constitution a_s limited by
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the territorial legislation.

The territorial act of 1892

in effect declared this is the status and
these are the powers of the University but
they are not static, they are subject to
the laws of Utah from time to time enacted.
It in effect declared the University is a
public corporation, but not a corporation
above the Legislature. It shall always be
subject to the laws of Utah.
295 P.2d at 357.
The extensive language of that case quoted by Respondent is relevant
only in the context of the issues of that case, which were different
from those of instant case.

Respondent errs in its claim that this

appeal is "plainly controlled11 by the earlier decision.

Respondents

use of that case is inapposite at best, since First Equity in no way
espouses the position of the University of Utah that state universities are totally autonomous and outside the control of the Legislature.
Rather, Appellant agrees with the Court in that case that USU is
subject to the control of and limitations imposed by the legislature;
Appellant argues only that such control and limitations permitted
the University to invest in common stock.
More relevant to this appeal is that portion of University of
Utah vs. Board of Examiners which recites the following principle
of construction from 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law §32, at 70:
In determining the meaning of an ambiguous
constitutional provision, the courts may
properly seek extrinsic aid by ascertaining
the construction at the time of its adoption
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and since by those whose duty it has been to
construe, execute, and apply it in practice.
The facts of this case upon which both parties are in agreement clearly establish that those persons whose duty it was to
construe and apply the powers available to them under the total
framework of Utah law believed that the University had power to
invest in common stock.

In addition, it is arguable that the long-

standing investment practices of Utahfs public universities, including
the purchase and sale of common stock, are so commonly known as to
warrant judicial notice being taken of them.

In any case, the entire

record below establishes that the Utah State Board of Regents, the
USU Institutional Council, officers and employees of USUfs financial
management departments, and counsel at the Utah State Attorney
Generalfs Office all believed USU to be empowered to purchase common
stock.

Respondent points out that evidence on this question was not

offered below, and argues that the Court may draw an inference from
this fact that the evidence would have been unfavorable to First
Equity.

In the court below, First Equity took the position that the

ultra vires issue was totally irrelevant since agency and estoppel
doctrines in any event required a finding in its favor.

On that

basis, evidence concerning the pattern and practice was not relevant
at that time.

However, if this Court determines that the statutes in j

question in this appeal are ambiguous (and the opposing views taken

i

by the parties in their briefs mights well support such a determinatior
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Appellants would join amici in suggesting that the court below be
instructed to consider evidence on the question on remand.
2.

Interpretation of §33-1-1.

.•..•'.'•'Respondent's view of 4A Utah Code Annotated ("U.C.A.")
§33-1-1 as an enabling provision, despite the attempt to curcumvent
the implications of its position for private entities in its Brief
at page 23, must fail in light of the unambiguous language of the
statute itself, heretofore cited by Appellant on pages 18-19 of its
Brief.

The title of S.B. 158 (Laws of Utah, 1939) enacting §33-1-1

is, in this case, irrelevant according to Respondent's cited canon
of construction since the statute is in no way ambiguous:

it says

quite clearly that the described entities may lawfully invest in the
described securities.

The entities so described include "private,

political, or public11 instrumentalities, bodies, corporations
persons.

and

The fact that the statutory title does not mention private

entities, as pointed out by Respondent, is not of earthshaking significance, since the title also fails to mention a number of other classes
of potential investors whose coverage by the statute Respondent is
unlikely to challenge, for example:

receivers, municipalities, a state

insurance fund, state sinking fund, or state school fund, and any
board, commission or officer of the state government.

Thus, Respon-

dent's attempt to avoid the extreme and untenable implications of its
interpretation of §33-1-1 is unconvincing.

Appellant reemphasizes
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the language of the statute itself is controlling and that language
contemplates already existing powers to invest funds.

If new

powers of investment theretofore non-existent were intended to be
brought into being by §33-1-1, the canons of statutory construction
urged upon this Court by Respondent, at pages 18-22 of Respondents
Brief, would certainly require a clear and affirmative grant of such
powers.

Section 33-1-1 not only contains no language which could

be so construed, but also it does contain language which contradicts
that interpretation.

Respondent^ position requires the absurd

conclusion that, prior to the enactment of §33-1-1, USU had no power
to invest in anything, nor did any of the entities described in that
section.

Such a conclusion flies in the face of common sense and

the extensive legislative history and statutory language before this
Court.
POINT II
EVEN IF USU HAD NO AUTHORITY TO PURCHASE COMMON STOCK, IT
HAD AUTHORITY TO CONTRACT FOR FIRST EQUITY'S SERVICES, AND IS LIABLE
ON THOSE CONTRACTS FOR THE VALUE OF THOSE SERVICES.
USU states that First Equity should not be allowed to argue
before this Court that it was USUfs agent because it did not raise the
argument in the court below.

See Respondent's Brief at page 44.

The authorities cited by USU to support its statement are clearly
distinguishable from this case.
Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P.2d 185 (1954),
involved an appellant who sought to have the decision below reversed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

because he had asked the court to give erroneous instructions to
the jury.

No objection to the instructions had been raised, but on

the basis of appellantfs instructions, the jury had found against
him.

This Court determined that the appellant could not assign as

error the giving of his own instructions.

In Davis v. Mulholland,

25 Utah 2d 56, 475 P.2d 834 (1970), the appellant had tried his
contract rescission claim on the theory that there had been a mutual
mistake of fact.

On appeal from the judgment against him, the appel-

lant argued for reversal on the theory that there had been a unilateral
mistake of fact.

This Court stated:

Ordinarily an appellant cannot change his theory
of the case on appeal from that presented to the
court below.
475 P.2d at 834.
First Equity does not now seek to reverse on the basis of its
own errors below, nor has First Equity changed its theory on appeal.
First Equity claimed in its Complaint that it was a registered
securities broker and that it had entered into agreements with USU
to purchase securities for USU.

The confirmations of the transactions,

copies of which are attached to the Complaint, each state:
BROKER, WE HAVE PURCHASED FOR YOUR ACCOUNT."

tf

AS

It is perfectly clear

that the fact of First Equity's agency, as broker, was before the
court below.

Furthermore, Appellant does not and has not changed

its theory on appeal.

First Equity continues to assert that it was

the authorized agent of USU and that, as such, it is entitled to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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compensation for its services and to be indemnified for losses
it suffered in performing, at USUfs request, acts which were not
manifestly illegal and which it had no knowledge were illegal (if
in fact they were illegal, which First Equity also disputes).
Finally, USU itself raised the question of whether or not a triable
issue of fact is present with respect to the amount of individual
grant monies that were available for investment in common stock.
The court below ruled in USU's favor on that question and First
Equity has merely emphasized the agency relationship to point out the
error of the lower courtfs decision.

This Court has no legal basis

to ignore Appellantfs argument as USU suggests.
In further response to Respondent^ suggestion that this Court
disregard First Equityfs arguments on this question, the following
language is cited:
The rule requiring adherence to the theory
relied on below does not mean that the parties
are limited in the appellate court to the same
reasons or arguments advanced in the lower court
upon the matter or question in issue [citations
omitted].
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal & Error §546.
The question in issue before the lower court and before this
Court is USUfs liability to First Equity for broker's commissions
and losses. First Equity has simply offered on appeal an additional
reason and argument for such liability; the argument is properly made.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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USU argues on page 44 of its Brief that First Equity was the ;
"other party to five contracts with USU whereby USU was to pay it
commissions for its services.11
USU attempts to counter First Equityfs agency analysis with
the point that "a broker often acts as the agent of the seller as
well as the buyer,11 at page 45 of its Brief. First Equity acknowledges
the accuracy of this observation, but alleges that, on the factual
record in this case, it is beside the point, since First Equity was
USUfs agent in each of the transactions sued upon below.

USU may

not "concede" the point (Respondents Brief at page 45) but there
is clearly evidence showing this to be the case. Attached as Exhibits
to Plaintifffs Complaint in this case are the confirmations of USU!s
unsolicited orders, each of which bears the notation, in large black
type, "AS BROKER, WE HAVE PURCHASED FOR YOUR ACCOUNT."

In the

absence of any evidence to the contrary (which evidence would of
course have been within USUfs power to produce below), this Court
and USU are bound by the language of the confirmations contained as
part of the Record here. 7B U.C.A. §70A-8-319(c).
USU then makes the surprising argument, unsupported by references
to either the record or to authority that "those contracts were ultra
vires", and "are as unenforceable as any other ultra vires contract
for the performance of services." Appellant submits that there is
nothing in the record to indicate that USU had no power to contract
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with a broker for its services.
most of the

Brokers have been known to deal in

,!

lawful,f securities described in §33-1-1, and Respondent

clearly could not argue that a contract with a broker to purchase
that type of security would be ultra vires. The brokerage contract
is of course the same, notwithstanding the type of securities purchased.

USU is confusing what were in actuality two separate series

of contractual transactions - one whereby it purchased and/or sold
stock to or from a third party, and another whereby it employed
First Equity to execute the first series of transactions as USUfs
agent, in return for which services it promised to pay a fee.

Since

contracting for brokerage services is clearly within the proper
powers of USU, the argument that the contracts between USU and First
Equity are unenforceable because they were ultra vires is untenable.
With respect to Respondent^ argument that First Equity, and
not a third party, should bear the losses suffered in this case,
Appellant observes both that the above analysis of USUfs contractual
liability makes that argument superflous and second, that the cases
Respondent cites as supporting its position are inappositee

For

example, in Hirning v. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 52 F.2d
382 (8th Cir., 1931) cited on page 46 of Respondent's Brief, the
defendant agent was an agent for third parties, which third parties
received illegal preferential transfers via the agent bank's actions.
In contrast to an injured party not agent or principal in Hirning, i.e.
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the insolvent bank entitled to "return of preferential transfers for
proper distribution by the receiver, the instant case presents us
with the quite distinct circumstance of a principal attempting to
renegue on its contractual obligations to an agent on the grounds
that it had no power to order the agent to buy and sell certain
types of securities, even though it clearly did have power to agree
to compensate the agent for services rendered.
Inland Waterways v. Hardee, 100 F.2d 678, (D.C. Cir., 1938),
revfd on other grounds, 309 U.S. 517, cited on page 47 of USUfs Brief,
also involved a totally distinct factual situation.

It was a suit by

the receiver of the insolvent Commercial National Bank of Washington
City against Inland Waterways Corp., the U.S. Shipping Board Merchant
Fleet Corporation, and several other parties. The Merchant Fleet
Corporation deposited funds belonging to its principal, (the United
States government) with Commercial National Bank.

It extracted from

the Bank an illegal pledge of Bank assets (U.S. Bonds) to secure
that deposit.

Subsequent to the Bankfs insolvency the bonds had been

sold and the Fleet Corporation had returned the funds to the U.S.
Treasury.

The Court, in explaining its decision that the Fleet

Corporation must make good the proceeds of the bond sale to the
insolvent Bank, said:
The question, as we think, does not depend upon
the ability of the receiver to trace the funds which
the Corporation received from the assets of the bank,
but is controlled by the rule that one who participates
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in a breach of trust may be required either to
account for the proceeds or respond in damages
. . . o In this case the corporation deposited
funds under its control in a national bank and
received from the bank . . . security . « . .
The pledge was unlawful . . . . When the Corporation demanded and received and used the
pledged security, . . . . a conversion of trust
property ensued. [emphasis added]
100 F.2d 678.
Once again, the agent in the above case represented a third
party principal not a plaintiff, and the injured party had suffered
loss because of the agent.

The agent itself had caused injury by

a "breach of trust11 and a "conversion11 of trust property, as the
emphasized portions above indicate.

These facts in no way comport

with those of this case, in which the principal seeks to avoid and
to shift to its agent losses incurred because of its own acts and
not by any wrongdoing or illegal act of its agent.

In addition,

the equitable considerations clearly uppermost in the minds of the
Courts deciding the above cases have no application to the case at
bar.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING FIRST EQUITYfS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE A TECHNICAL VIOLATION OF THE 35-DAY MARGIN
REQUIREMENT OF REGULATION T DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A COMPLETE DEFENSE
TO FIRST EQUITY'S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES.
1.

Court Interpretation.
USUfs unblushing conclusion to its abbreviated discussion

of the case law dealing with the effect of a violation of Section 7
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of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act11) is as
follows:
Judge Christofferson was eminently correct in
following Avery in holding Regulation T to
provide a complete and not just a partial defense.
Respondent's Brief, at 56.
First Equity agrees that the decision below was notable, but not for
its correctness.

Indeed, USU does not explain why it is able to

conclude that the decision in Avery v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1971), was a worthy example
to follow.

The Avery decision was not in harmony with United States

Supreme Court interpretation of the Exchange Act.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).

See Mills v.

The grim result in

Avery did not correspond to the equitable result in Pearlstein v.
Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1970), the case upon which
the judge in Avery seemed to rely.

The Avery judge also claimed to

rely upon the unequivocal mandate of Congress and strong public policy
considerations placing the burden of compliance solely upon brokers.
328 F. Supp. at 681.

But in 1971 Congress amended the Exchange Act

to place the burden of compliance upon customers as well as brokers.
See Section 7(f) of the Exchange Act; Regulation X, 12 C.F.R. Part
224 (1975).

Following that amendment, courts have begun to deny

customers the recovery of damages from brokers in implied civil
actions based upon unforeseen violations of Regulation T.
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

See State

of Utah v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.

Civil No.

NC 74-46, Memorandum Opinion and Order (D. Utah, July 8, 1975);
Newman v, Pershing & Co., Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 1[95,060 (S.D.N.Y. April 14, 1975); Bell v. J.P.
Winer & Co., Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
1195,002 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 1975).
USU makes the following representation as to the law on
Regulation T at page 50 of its Brief:
It is settled that a customer may recover damages
from a broker in a civil lawsuit for violating
Regulation T and, <a fortiori, that a customer may
lawfully resist payment he would otherwise be
obligated to make where the broker has violated
Regulation T.
In light of the enactments of Congress and the decisions of the
federal courts, cited herein and in Appellant's Brief at 42, and in
light of the decisions of the state appellate courts, such as
DuPont, Glore, Forgan, Inc.

v. Mariash, 75 Misc. 2d 450, 347 N.Y.S.

2d 886 (1st Dept. 1973) and others cited in Appellantfs Brief at
pages 46-47, USUfs representation is seen clearly as an abbreviated
and unedifying misstatement of the law6

The decision below, which

upholds USUfs simplistic representation, is "eminently" incorrect.
2.

Violation of a Contract of Adhesion.
As an alternative Regulation T defense, Respondent claims

that it is excused from paying First Equity because, in not making
delivery within the 35-day margin requirement, Appellant breached
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the contracts of adhesion it imposed upon USU.

Respondent fails

to support this claim with any pertinent facts, or statutory or .".
case law.
The crux of USUfs argument is that the confirmations sent to
USU to evidence the oral purchase agreements were contracts of adhesion.

In support of that position, USU alleges that (1) the confir-

mations were prepared by First Equity, (2) the language is "stock
language11, and (3) no negotiations occurred with respect to that
language.

Such allegations, even if true, do not constitute over-

reaching and unconscionability such as is necessary to find a contract
of adhesion.
Someone has to prepare a written memorandum of an oral contract
if a written record is to be kept and, under the conditions existing
in the securities industry, it is less burdensome for the broker to
prepare all such memoranda than for the broker to rely upon its
customers to draft such documents.

The applicable statute of frauds,

Section 8-319(c) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 7B U.C.A. §70A-8319(c), recognizes this practice and states:
A contract for the sale of securities is not
enforceable by way of action or defense unless
. . .

within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the sale or purchase and sufficient
against the sender under paragraph (a) has been
received by the party against whom enforcement
is sought and he has failed to send written
objection to its contents within ten days after
its receipt . . . .
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The Draftsmenfs Comment to this provision states:
Paragraph (c) is particularly important
in the relationship of broker and customer.
Normally a great volume of such business is
done over the telephone. Orders are executed
almost immediately and confirmed on the same
or the next business day, usually on standard
forms which as to the broker more than meet
the minimal requirements of paragraph (a).
It is reasonable to require the customer to
raise his objection, if any, within ten days
after the confirmation has been received . . . •
Draftsmen's Comment 2., [Current Materials Vol.2] UCC REP. SERV.
118319.
The practicalities of preparing these confirmations imposes
upon the broker the necessity of using a standard form with "stock
language" that is not negotiated with the customer.

Furthermore, it

would make no sense to negotiate the language which supposedly bothers
USU because the language simply draws to the attention of the customer
matters (1) which are required by law to be disclosed, or (2) which
are a part of the law applicable to the transaction and part of the
contract whether stated or not.

Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst

Oil & Ref. Co.% 287 U.S. 358 (1932); Swenson v. File, 90 Cal. Rptr.
580, 475 P.2d 852 (1970); Yeazell v. Copins, 98 Ariz. 109, 402 P.2d
541 (1965).
Brokers realize that many of their investors are not sophisticated and that such investors are not aware of the complex regulatory
framework in which securities transactions take place.
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Thus, most

of the terms set forth on the confirmations seek to inform the
investor of the laws applicable to the transaction, thereby reducing
much of the potential for needless controversy which an oral contract
often carries with it.
In addition to the functional necessity for brokers to preapre
confirmations, Rule 17a-3(a)(6) of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (l!SECfl) requires registered brokers to maintain a record
of each brokerage order.

See 17 C.F.R. §240.17a-3(a)(6). The same

Rule requires that the memorandum of each brokerage order
. . . shall show the terms and conditions of
the order or instructions and of any modification or cancellation thereof, the account
for which entered, the time of entry, the
price at which executed and, to the extent
feasible, the time of execution or cancellation.
Thus, each of First Equityfs confirmations contains on its face the
necessary information and instructions, and then states:

ff

We

confirm this transaction subject to agreement on the reverse side.11
Record at pages 111-149. The reverse side contains the terms and
conditions affecting cash account brokerage orders under the bold
heading "CONDITIONS.11 Record at page 272.
The first condition informs the investor of the provisions of U.C.C.
Section 8-319(c), stating: lfIt is agreed that. . . Fy]ou will report any
errors immediately and/or notify us if not entirely in accordance with
your understanding."

This provisions calls to the customers attention
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the fact that the contract may be altered if the confirmation slip
is not entirely in accordance with his understanding.

The changes

are to be reported immediately because, after ten days, U.C.C.
Section 8-319(c) makes the confirmation binding upon the parties.
See Anderson v. Francis I. DuPont & Co,, 9 UCC REP. SERV. 500 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. July 20, 1971); Weiss v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co,, 443
S.W. 2d 934 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1969).
The second condition, which is expressly applicable to this
appeal, states in relevant part:

"it is agreed that . . . [a] 11

transactions are subject to the rules, regulations, requirements
(including margin requirements) and customs

of the Federal Reserve

Board . . . ." This statement is clearly not negotiable because
such rules and regulations would apply whether or not the foregoing
language was expressly agreed to. Applicable law and regulation
again have been drawn to the customerfs attention.
The third paragraph of conditions, dealing with the hypothecation of securities, draws to the customer's attention the provisions
of SEC Rule 8c-l(c), 17 C.F.R. §240.18-l(c).

The last paragraph of

conditions deals in part with disclosures that the National Association of Securities Dealers ("N.A.S.D") requires its members to make.
S>ee N.A.S.D. Rules of Fair Practice, Art. Ill, §12, CCH N.A.S.D.
MANUAL 1(2162. Also the last paragraph of conditions deals in part
with the brokerfs rights upon the customerfs failure to make payment
by the settlement date, which rights are a matter of law. See
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Baldwin v. Peters, Writer & Christensen, 141 Colo. 529, 349 P.2d
146 (1960); Mass v. Gordon, 101 So.2d 836 (Fla. App. 1958); Rosenstock v, Tormey, 32 Md. 169 (1870).

These conditions were simply

matters of law and regulations, some of which were required to be
disclosed, which governed the transactions.

Therefore, the claim

that this "stock language11 was not negotiated between the parties
makes no sense.

The laws referred to in such "stock language11 ap-

plied to the transactions whether or not they were mentioned in
the confirmations.
Based upon the foregoing discussion and authorities, it is
clearly improper to characterize these confirmations as contracts
of adhesion.

They are not cunningly devised contracts drafted by

a powerful commercial unit and imposed upon an individual on an
"accept this or get nothing" basis.
Section 1376 (1960).

See 6A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS

There is no overreaching, no unconscionable

imposition of liability, no attempt to so restrict the customer as
to leave no avenue of escape.

See New Prague Flouring Mill Co. v.

Spears, 194 Iowa 417, 189 N.W. 815 (1922).

The confirmation slips

are not contracts of adhesion.
The second major flaw in Respondent's defense is that USU alleges
that a failure to deliver the securities within 35 days constituted
a sufficient breach of the contract to allow USU to rescind and
incur no liability.

The 35-day limit is not specified in the con-

firmations, nor is any right to rescind specified.

USU relies

solely on the provision that calls the customer's attention to the
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fact that the contract
is subject
the
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errors. "margin requirements"

of the Federal Reserve Board.

Those margin requirements, as con-

strued by the courts, include much more than the 35-day limit provided by Regulation T.

For example, Regulation X of the margin

requirements placed the responsibility upon USU not to allow its
purchases through First Equity to take longer than 35 days*

It is

clear that USU has voluntarily breached that provision; USU utilized
First Equity because of the delays inherent in receiving stock
certificates from a Florida brokerage house.

Deposition of Catron

at pages 118-19, 218-21.
It has been judicially recognized that a strict construction of
the margin requirements in favor of customers and against brokers
extends the protection of the laws to a point where the purposes of
the securities laws are impeded.

Newman v. Pershing & Co., Inc.,

[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. K95,060 (S.D.N.Y.
April 4, 1975).

A strict construction against brokers may tend to

encourage customers to do as USU has done, to wit:

(1) to utilize

a broker who may perform the contracts in violation of Regulation T
due to de minimus % unforeseeable human error, and (2) to then seek to
place all the risk and liability of the transaction on the broker.
Thus, a strict construction such as USU contends is necessary in
this case

encourages unlawful behavior rather than discouraging it.

Furthermore, in construing the language of the confirmations,
the Court is required to bear in mind the situation of the parties
and the subject matter of the contract.

In preparing the confirmation
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the broker is not required to state anything about laws or regulations applicable to the transaction, except for the limited disclosure
required by Article III, Section 12 of the N.A.S.D. Rules of Fair
Practice discussed previously.

The broker does not have to inform

his customer of the legal consequences that may flow from the transaction, but if he does not, the customer could embroil the broker
in needless controversies, needless court actions could be instituted, or the customer could continue to invest in an uninformed manner.
If the broker exercises his discretion to inform his customer of the
applicable laws, rules, and regulations, then, according to the
interpretation of the confirmations that USU puts forward, the broker
should be held strictly accountable for any alleged ambiguity in the
confirmations.

Such a rule would serve to discourage brokers from

educating their customers and to encourage needless controversy.
Finally, this Court cannot simply rely upon what USU erroneously
refers to as "an accepted canon of statutory construction." Respondent's
Brief at 57. That canon of construction can only come into play if
there is an ambiguity in the contract and there is no ambiguity here.
The contract refers to the margin requirements of the Federal Reserve
Board and they are, of course, spelled out in the applicable laws
and regulations.

Such laws and regulations, as interpreted by the

courts, do not include the right to rescind a brokerage contract for
a

^£ minimus violation resulting from human error, particularly when

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-21-

the party seeking to rescind is the party which encouraged the
violation.

Moreover, even if there is an ambiguity, which First

Equity emphatically denies, there is another accepted canon of construction which requires that comparatively unimportant matters which
may be severed from the agreement without impairing its effect or
changing its character, such as an educational reference to the
applicable lax*, must be suppressed if in that way and only that
way the agreement can be sustained and enforced.

Rhoades v,

Chesapeake & O.R. Co., 49 W. Va. 494, 39 S # E. 209 (1901).

Needless

to say, a battle of canons, such as USUfs Brief encourages, would
only obfuscate the real issues. A broker simply is not required
by law to insure its customer against all losses attendant to
investing through a margin account.
POINT IV
FIRST EQUITY HAD NO CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF ANY WITHDRAWAL OF
CATRONfS AUTHORITY BECAUSE THE COLLECTING BANKS WERE NOT FIRST
EQUITY1S AGENTS.
Judge Christofferson concluded his memorandum decision by
stating:
In view of the above rulings, the court feels
that it is unnecessary to comment on further
defenses of Utah State, such as the First
Security and Walker Bank and Trust Company
being agents of the plaintiff and their knowledge that Catron had no authority to purchase
common stock as a defense. The court feels
that both have merit, but has indicated in
view of the previous rulings the court feels
further comment is unnecessary . . . .
Record at page
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The question of whether the banks were First Equity's agents is
governed by the provisions of the Uniform Commericial Code, as
Respondent has pointed out in its Brief, pages 59 and 60. Therein
Respondent noted that 7B U.C.A. Section 70A-4-104(l)(g), provides:
"item" means any instrument for the
payment of money even though it is not
negotiable but does not include money.
Respondent also drew attention to the fact that 7B U.C.A. Section
70A-4-105(d) states:
"Collecting bank" means any bank handling
the item for collection except the payor
bank.
Additionally, Respondent relied upon a somewhat analagous case,
Phelan v. University Natfl Bank, 85 111. App. 2d 56, 229 N.E. 2d
374 (1967), in which it was held that the stock broker could not
recover from the bank for failure to pay for the securities because
the bank was a "collecting bank" and not a "payor bank."
Finally, Respondent cites 7B U.C.A. Section 70A-4-2Gl(l),
which provides:
Unless a contrary intent clearly appears
and prior to the time that a settlement
given by a collecting bank for an item is
or becomes final, the bank is an agent or
subagent of the owner of the item . . • .
On that basis, USU claims that the banks involved in this case
were the agents of First Equity and, therefore, First Equity is
chargeable with whatever notice the bank officers received from
reading news items that appeared in newspapers on December 15, 1973.
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Record, at pages 326-27, 337-39.

However, neither of the banks

was acting as a collecting bank at that time.

Record, at pages

99-149, 160-62; Deposition, at pages 80-81.
There are other clear reasons why the presumption of agency
stated in Section 70A-4-201(l) should be disregarded in this case.
First, the presumption was established for the purpose of settling
the nature of the depositor-bank relationship in a situation where
the collecting bank is being sued by the owner of the item that is
deposited for collection.

See Draftsmenfs Comments 1 and 2, [Current

Materials Vol. 2] UCC REP. SERV. 1[4201. That purpose was well served
in the Phelan case where the bank was named as a defendant, but there
is no defendant bank here.

Thus, the entire purpose for the pre-

sumption fails in this case.
Furthermore, it is not true, as USU states, that Phelan involved
"a factual situtation identical11 to the one in this case.

Respondent1

Brief at page 60. The court in PheIan stated that the broker-dealer
in that case had sold common stock to the investor» implying certainlj
that it was a "principal11 transaction rather than a "broker11 transaction .

In this case the broker purchased common stock for the

investor.

First Equity was not the owner of the securities, but

simply acted as agent for USU in obtaining the securities and forwarding them to USUfs designated banks.

USU is also incorrect when

it states that the "paper work involved in the instant case is even
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identical to that in Phelan."

Respondent's Brief at page 61. The

transmittal letter to the defendant bank in Phelan stated:

ff

We

enclose for collection and remittance in Chicago funds only when
actually paid." (Emphasis added).
Security Bank simply states:

The instruction letter to First

"For delivery to a/c Utah State

University against payment of draft attached ($67,019.00).

Please

credit our account WITH FEDERAL RESERVE BANK IN JACKSONVILLE FLORIDA
THRU WIRE ADVICE ATTENTION of the undersigned.11

(Emphasis added).

(Record, at page 307). Thus, the function of each bank in this
case was primarily one of receipt of stock certificates for USU,
its account-holder.

USU directed which bank should be used by

First Equity for that purpose and the bank primarily accepted delivery
for USU and paid out its account-holderfs funds to First Equity.

In

such a situation, it may be true that the banks are formally designated as collecting banks, but the presunption of agency should
clearly be set aside.

First Equity, acting as purchasing agent for

USU, simply transferred securities to the banks, acting as receiving
agents of USU.

The banks were not First Equityfs agents.
CONCLUSION

Respondent's argument that the lower court decision denying
First Equity's Motion for Summary Judgment should be upheld because
"other defenses11 were available to USU is totally outside the scope
of this appeal.

Since the lower court did not rule on these matters

(discussed at pages 65-72 of Respondent's Brief), the questions have
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not been presented for appeal, and Respondent's arguments are
not properly before this Court.
In conclusion, Appellant urges that the orders of the lower
court be reversed, and the case be remanded for trial on the issues
which require further evidence.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHNSON & SPACKMAN

By /s/ Randall P» Spackman
Randall P. Spackman

By /s/ Christine M. Durham
Christine M. Durham
Attorneys for Appellant
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